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158 Idaho

154,345 P.3d 213 (2015).

Cedillo, the district court entered its Judgment on December 11, 2013. The Judgment
confirmed Arbitrator

Clark's final award. The district court's Judgment also awarded

Cedillo $5,608. 00 as Farmers unpaid balance of the arbitration award, prejudgment interest of
$132. 01 on the unpaid balance of the arbitration award, and $121,007. 00 as attorney fees.
Rather than pay the district court's judgment, Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho
(hereafter "Farmers") appealed the district court's Judgment. This Court affirmed the district
court's Judgment on March 05, 2015.

Farmers did not pay the district court's Judgment as

affirmed by this Court until March 23, 2015. R. p. 201.
Regarding the facts relevant to Cedillo's UIM claim, Farmers' sole focus on the insured's
conduct, rather than its own conduct, was and is misplaced.

fact, Farmers did not pay Cedillo

amount justly due her until almost six (6) years after Farmers received Cedilla's proof of loss
on July 25, 2009, which provided Farmers with sufficient information

it to investigate

pay Cedillo's UIM claim. B-~00201.
In its Respondent's Brief Farmers cites only facts which support its contentions that
Cedillo's conduct in submitting

UIM was faulty. Farmers completely ignores Idaho case law

insurcd's conduct is wholly
Nowhere does

acknowledge

at the summary judgment stage.
duties owed to

adjusting

l.
to
Cedillo's

district court's discovery rulings simply disregards the appellate
more than adequately recites

Court's standards of appellate
to preserve the discovery issues ignores

These repeated allegations that Cedillo has

the express invitations of the district court and the United

District Court of Idaho -- that

this Court address the unique discovery issues encountered in this litigation of a bad faith tort
claim. Cedillo has requested this Court to address those issue in this case.
As it did in the district court,

fails to evaluate the adequacy of its investigation,

its analysis and its payment of Cedillo's UIM claim. Farmers fails to even acknowledge that
once its liability is admitted, as in this case, it has
and fairly pay such claims.

duties to fairly investigate, fairly analyze,

facts of this case establish a stonewalling strategy which is

consistent with Farmers' complete failure to treat Cedillo's UIM claim

ARGUMENT

A.

Cedillo's bad faith tort claim concerns Farmers' conduct, not Cedillo's conduct.
[n deciding the outcome of this appeal, the Court is asked to focus on the

issue as

stated by Farmers' attorney m the summary judgment hearing, which is " ... evaluating what
as they went
2016, p. 4 lines l

or

the

and p. 7, lines 12-14.

2

judgment held on

7,

faith

arbitration,
to

court

not turn on

could

underinsured tortfeasor. However,

asserted,
s bad faith

some of the

available

is an entirely separate

In Cedilla's bad faith claim Farmers is not to be " ... treated just as if it was the tortfeasor."

Weinstein v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299,233 P.3d 1221, 1235 (?010).
As this Court stated in Weinstein, "We have never held that the relationship between an
insurance company providing UM coverage and its insured is the same as the relationship
between its insured and the uninsured tortfeasor." Weinstein at 1239.
Pursuant to Idaho case law, the relationship

an msurance company and its

insured does not vary depending upon whether the insured is making a claim under UM
coverage, UIM coverage, or another type of coverage. Rather, "the tort of bath faith breach of
insurance contract ... is founded upon the unique relationship of the insurer and the insured, the
adhesionary nature of

insurance contract including the potential for overreaching on the part

of the insurer, and the unique, 'non-commercial' aspect of the insurance contract."

White v.

Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94,100,730 P.2d 1014, 1020 (1986), as cited in Weinstein at
1249. These factors apply to all types of coverage. An insurance company can certainly raise
any issues and defenses that the tortfcasor could have raised, but it cannot raise frivolous issues
and defenses in bad faith even though the tortfcasor could get away with such conduct.

Weinstein at 1249. As stated in Sullivan v. Allstate

3

11

304, 306,

or
adjudicated." The insurance company
makes a

the

to act in good

a

coverage of the policy.

insured

v. Bongard, 1

Idaho 780, 785, 864

P.2d 618,623 n. 5 (1993), as cited by Weinstein at 1249.
"The covenant requires the parties to perform, in good faith, the obligations contained
their agreement." Van v. Portneuf Med Ctr., 147 Idaho 552, 562, 212

982, 9092 (2009).

quasi-fiduciary relationship continues even if the insured initiates a first-party lawsuit
against the insurer because the lawsuit does not necessarily create an adversarial relationship
between the insured and the

White v. Unigard A1ut. Ins.

112 Idaho 94, l 00, 730

P.2d 1014, 1020 ( 1986). Evaluating an action for bad faith in failing to promptly investigate and
promptly settle a valid claim depends upon the particular facts of the case. Id at 120.
In the state of Idaho, adjustment of an UIM claim, once the claim is accepted by the
insurer, is no different than any other first-party insurance claim. Despite Farmers' repeated,
hyper-procedural effort to deflect the

s attention, an arbitration clause does not change the

quasi-fiduciary obligations of an insurance company. This Court has stated:
"The existence of a right to the arbitration of genuinely disputed claims cannot
shield an insurer who demands arbitration of claims that are not genuinely
disputed or requests unnecessary documentation merely to delay the settlement
process."

Inland Group of'Companies, Inc. v. Providence Washinf;lon Ins. Co., 133 Idaho
249, 256, 985 P.2d 674, 681 (1999).

4

to
Responses to

also,-~----"
Farmers

certainly have contested Cedilla's

chose not to deny liability.

liability.

it

Farmers had denied liability it could have contested the extent of

causation, the necessity

Cedillo's medical expenses or other economic

damages, such as wage loss. Under this scenario Farmers would have had no obligation to be
fair to Cedillo.

p. 16, line 22 to p. 17, line 3. But the record clearly establishes Farmers'

liability was never an issue: liability for Cedillo's UIM

was accepted by Farmers on

August 25, 2009.
The issue before this Court is to be resolved by focusing on Farmers' conduct in
adjusting Cedillo's UIM claim, including Farmers' duties and its breach of those duties.
Cedillo's conduct is wholly irrelevant.
and testimony

court erred
considered

deciding whether or not Cedillo's claim was "fairly debatable."

The issue before the district court and now this Court is whether Cedillo provided the
district court with sufficient testimony

evidence to demonstrate the existence of a genuine

of material fact as to whether her claim was not fairly debatable. Sec, Lakeland True Value

Hardware, /,LC v. Harford Fire Insurance Company, 153 Idaho 716, 721, 291 P.3d 399, 404

5

amounts

at

And it was caused - that dispute in the
caused by the Plaintiffs not providing all

was also

information the Defendant

it needed,

specifically, the inventory. And that is what led to the delay." !d at 403.

Lakeland this Court affirmed the district court's grant
insurer on the insured's bad faith claim.

summary judgment to the

However, it did " ... not do so based on the narrow

ground that Lakeland made inconsistent and changing claim demands upon Hartford." Id at 405.
This Court declined " ... to follow this line of reasoning because, even though an insured may
make differing requests for compensation, the claim may be not fairly debatable if the insurer
possesses sufficient information to make a reasonably certain value of the claim.

Id at 405.

The Lakeland court explained that "[a]t summary judgment on Lakeland's bad faith
claim, fault upon Lakeland is wholly irrelevant." !d at 404. Yet, in this case the district court
granted Farmers' summary judgment squarely on what it found to be Cedillo's faults, and
disregarded Farmers' faults, such as its sloppy and slow adjustment of her claim.
The district court found fault with Cedillo's initial demand for policy limits of $500,000.
The district court found fault with Ccdi!!o's supposed failure to provide adequate
information to allow Farmers to investigate her claim. R. p. 002297. The district court found
fault with what it labeled as Ccdillo's "shift" in the basis for her demands. R. p.~002298. The
district court found fault with Cedilla's wage loss claim

6

that she failed to

a wage loss

to
that
to
information needed by Defendant to evaluate
claim. Although the Plaintiff's overall demand remained
same
policy limits her support for such
was slow in coming
and
did appear to include new damages in the mix as the
claim investigation progressed."
district court did exactly what this Court had forbidden in the Lakeland case.

district

Cedillo's bad faith claim, fault upon Cedillo was and is wholly irrelevant. Clearly, the district
court committed a reversible error in applying this irrelevant and impermissible standard in its
grant of summary judgment to Farmers. [twas and is Cedillo's burden to provide the Court with
specific triable facts upon which a jury may draw inferences in Cedillo's favor demonstrating
there exists genuine issues of material facts concerning whether Ccdillo's claim was fairly
debatable or not.
The evidence and record in this case at every level, adjustment, arbitration, confirmation
in the district court and in the Idaho Supreme Court, speak loudly in support of Cedilla's bad
faith claim. In arbitration the Arbitrator found that Cedillo provided a proof of loss to Farmers
on July

2009. This finding was confirmed by both the district court and this Court. See,

Cedillo v. Farmers 158 fdaho 154, 345 P.3d 213 (2015). Farmers does not dispute that the proof
of loss provided adequate information which obligated it to investigate and determine its rights
and liabilities in a fair and accurate manner.

7

to

not

should
Cedillo's conduct.
consideration,

term "fairly debatable" means that at the

the

was

or difference of opinion over the eligibility,

existed a legitimate

amount or value of the claim. Robinson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 137
Idaho 173, 176, 45

3d 829 at 833-34.

Eligibility or coverage has never been an issue in this case. Farmers

the district court

erred in treating Cedilla's claim as a third-party claim. Farmers immediately determined that the
driver who caused the crash was both underinsured and solely at fault. Once it had made that
determination, its duty to investigate and its analysis in deciding the amount or value of Cedillo's
claim was no different from its duties in deciding whether to pay any first-party claim. The fact
that Farmers could have raised any issue or defenses that could have in good faith been raised by
tortfcasor docs not alter the terms of the insurance policy, nor docs it add provisions to the
policy. See, Weinstein at 1239.
llo's claim was and is independent of

Farmers' duty to promptly investigate

whatever Cedillo or her attorney did or didn't do. Just as in Weinstein, Farmers knew it owed
Cedillo under her UIM coverage from the day it received her proof of loss on July 28, 2009. Just
as in Weinstein, Farmers never debated or disputed any of Cedillo's medical expenses of
$53,048.

62

submitted with her proof of loss on July

8

2009.

of35%

loudly

defense of

insurer).

The district court m granting Farmers' motion also relied upon Cedilla's
medical" issues.

caused her claim to be fairly

and pre-existing

debatable. ~002299. Cedillo's "complex medical" issues and/or pre-existing injury issues
were concocted by Farmers atter retaining Dr. Richard Wilson, a well-known insurance defense
doctor. Up until April 19, 2011, the date of Dr. Richard Wilson's report to Farmers' attorney (R.
Q.

1157), Farmers had no evidence or medical record which supported a theory of "complex

medical" issues and/or a pre-existing injury.
[n concluding that Cedillo's "complex medical" issues and/or pre-existing injury made
Cedillo's claim fairly debatable, the district court, again, completely ignored the quasi-fiduciary
relationship between Cedillo and her insurer, Farmers, which required Farmers to seek out
evidence and testimony which supported, not defeated, her claim.
upon the case of Lucas v. State Farm

In granting Farmers' motion the district court

Fire Casualty Co., 131 Idaho 674, 963, P.2d 357 (1998). The district court stated that it did
" ... not find this case to be on a par with Lucas, where there was no question as to whether the
claim was fairly debatable." R. p. 0022~,2. [n Lucas
doctors who appeared to be in disagreement as to

insured " ... was seen by six different

cause

Lucas's neck condition. None of

the doctors were able to definitely state that Lucas's neck condition was pre-existing or that it
related to the motor

accident. However, on

9

in response to [the

sj

was

cause

s

at p.

very
that

Court
conclude that

l.

reasonable

m favor

we

Smith's diagnosis is sufficient evidence to support Lucas's contention that his

claim was not reasonably

dispute. Thus, such evidence is sufficient to defeat State

motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether the claim is fairly debatable." Id at p.
361.

It is likely that the district court was swayed by the sheer volume of Cedillo's medical
records submitted by Farmers in support of its motion. Sec, R.__Q_J203-1233, 1234-1239, 1240:14_2'.3_, and 1509-1620. Yet, the district court did not need to scrutinize these hundreds of pages
of medical records. The Arbitrator, Mr. Clark, had already performed that task.
Arbitrator Clark judged Farmers' and Cedillo's medical evidence and testimony upon the
requirements of LR.

702 and whether the scientific basis for such evidence was reliable.

Arbitrator Clark judged the weight of Farmers' and Cedillo's evidence based upon the
qualifications of the witness, the opportunity of the witness for observation and opinions,
overall accuracy of the statements made by the witness, and the integrity of the witness.
Arbitrator Clark found that Farmers' "expert" witness testimony was inconsistent with the
evidence offered by Cedi!lo's three (3) treating (not

medical experts. Arbitrator Clark

concluded that Farmers' "expert" witness testimony lacked

evidentiary basis, was

improbable, was pure speculation, and/or was based upon possibilities and not evidence. See,
Appellant's

p. 4.

0

a.
b.

C.

. Wilson's

on

to
Cedillo would have had surgery at C5-6 even had there been no
accident.

d. Arbitrator Clark did not accept the opinion of . Wilson that Cedillo's
spondylosis alone caused the need for the surgery at C5-6.

e.

Wilson's testimony was not supported by the medical evidence.
Farmers' R. p. 52 and 57.

f.

The Arbitrator did not accept the opinion of Dr. Wilson. Farmers' R.
]2._57.

With regard to medical opinions expressed by Farmers' witness,

Williams, Arbitrator

Clark stated the following:
a. That the evidence does not support Dr. Williams' opinion. Farmers' R.

12~4b. That the Arbitrator will not make a finding of causation or
appointment based on possibilities. Farmers' fLQ_._49 and 142.
With regard to wage loss opinions expressed by Farmers' witness, Ms. Purvis, Arbitrator
Clark stated the following:
a.

That the Arbitrator finds no evidence to support any claim that Cedillo
failed to mitigate
loss of income following the cycle accident.
farmet~~~~58.

b. That the opinions of Ms. Purvis are not based on or supported by the
relevant evidence.
c.

That Ms. Purvis did not quantify any amount of lost income.

was not a
decisions.

testimony was provided by

right to, and did, disregard the testimony of

seen m
biased actors.
experts Wilson, Williams, and Purvis. The

district court, relying upon the same discredited witnesses and false testimony as offered by
Farmers in arbitration, instead found that Cedillo's claim was not fairly debatable. In doing so,
district court erred.
[n this case, at the summary judgment stage, the essential facts are not what Cedillo did
or did not do. The essential facts are not whether Cedillo's medical history presented "complex
medical" issues or a preexisting injury.

The facts to be considered by the district court at

summary judgment are what Farmers did or did not do to fairly investigate, and in the process,
substantiate Cedillo's UIM claim. The district court obviously erred in its grant of summary
judgment to Farmers.
C.

The district court not only erred

finding fault on Cedilla's part, but it also erred in

failing to conclude that the issues raised by Farmers in its summary judgment motion had been
resolved in Cedillo's favor in binding arbitration.
this Court stated in Cedillo, "[t]he matter went to
policy's requirement to arbitrate."

arbitration under Cedilla's

Cedillo at 217 (emphasis added).

The Cedillo Court

intentionally and purposely used the term "binding arbitration" as Farmers' UlM contract of
insurance required binding arbitration. Farmers UIM contract

2

insurance

Prehearing

J Re: Scheduling,

stated

dispute is submitted to
arbitration pursuant to the
Arbitration Clause in the Insurance Policy used
Respondent
and by agreement of the parties through their respective legal
counsel." Emphasis added. Farmers &JJJJ. 000016-000109.
In the Arbitrator's Decision and Interim Award, the arbitrator stated the following:
"The dispute has been submitted to binding arbitration pursuant to
the agreement to arbitrate, which is contained in the
policy." Emphasis added. Farmers R. pj). 000065 and 000508 00600), the Arbitrator's Amended Final Award (00173,
000565,000249,000266, 000270).
In Cedillo the district court's Memorandum Decision and Order on Motions on

Arbitration Award stated "[tjhe matter was ultimately submitted to binding arbitration pursuant
to the agreement to arbitrate contained in the insurance policy" (Emphasis added) Far:mers~
000644.
In this appeal, the term "binding arbitration" is found in the Clerk's Record at

[LR!L

000387, 00521, 000523, 000546, 000582, 000638, 000867, 000881, 001134, 001696, 002185,
002187, and 002286. Emphasis added.
The rule of resjudicata is "in an action between the same parties upon the same claim or
demand, the former adjudication concludes parties and privies not only as to every matter offered
and received to sustain or defeat the claim but also as to every matter which might and should
have been litigated in the first suit." Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Ko/ouch, 123 Idaho 434,
436-37, 849 P

107, 109-10 (1

v. Murphy

(quoting

13

and Irrigation

, 35

p

novo

The

were

Arbitrator considered Farmers' contentions and

them to be

The district court confirmed the Arbitrator's decision.

any
affirmed

district

court.
Farmers' UIM contract binds it to the results of the arbitration. Farmers' UIM arbitration
clause is intended to simplify and provide a speedy, less expensive conclusion to legitimate
disputes between Farmers and its insureds. Binding arbitration, which weighs the evidence, the
credibility of witnesses, the bias and demeanor of witnesses, just as in a court of law, is intended
to resolve claims

not to perpetuate claims. Whether Cedillo's claim was fairly debatable or not

been conclusively resolved in Cedillo's favor and should not be an issue in this case.
In the case of IfS. Cramer & Co. v. Washburn-Wilson Seed Co., 68 ldaho 416, 422, 195
P.2d 346, 350 ( 1948) this Court cited the following with approval:
"The award of arbitrators, acting within the scope of
authority,
determines the rights of the parties as effectually as judgment secured by
regular legal procedure, and is as binding as a judgment, until it is
regularly set aside or its validity questioned in a proper manner. Their
decision on matters of fact and law is conclusive, and all matters in the
award are henceforth res judicata, on the theory that the matter has been
adjudged by a tribunal which the parties have agreed to make final, a
tribunal of last resort for that controversy. And this has been held true
even in a case in which one of the parties neglected to present portions of
his claim.
had his chance, and, after the award, was concluded hereby,
and could secure no relief." [Emphasis added]

4

IS

true

contentions serve

of

drawn-out litigation and further support Cedillo's
Farmers.

this regard, this Court also stated

of bad

to prolong
on the

of

Hill, that the insured need not endure needless

delay and expensive litigation or lose his/her benefits. Hill at 820.
This Court's reasoning in Hill also considered that:
" .. .Idaho's courts will have to contend with unnecessary litigation merely so that
UIM claimants can preserve their benefits. Schmidt v. Clothier, 338 N.W.2d 256,
260 (Minn. 1983) (superseded by statute); Augustine v. Simonson, 940 P.2d 116,
120 (Mont. 1997). As this Court and the U.S. Supreme Court have held in cases
discussing collateral estoppel and res judicata, reducing repetitive or unnecessary
litigation is a legitimate goal, as it frees up judicial resources for legitimate
disputes. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 10 I S. Ct. 411, 415 (1980) (stating
that both collateral estoppel and res judicata conserve judicial resources);
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326, 99 S. Ct. 645, 649 (1979)
(similar); Brown v. Felson, 442 U.S. 127, 131, 99 S. Ct. 2205, 2209 (1979)
(holding that res judicata "frees the courts to resolve other disputes"); Maroun v.
Wyreless Sys., Inc., 141 Idaho 604, 617, 114, P. 3d 974, 987 (2005) (collateral
cstoppel); Sec also Pines, Inc. v. Bossingham, 131 Idaho 714, 717, 963 P.2d 397,
400 (Ct. App. 1998) (collateral cstoppel)."

Hill at 820.
The district court should have found Farmers' witness testimony to be seriously flawed,
unsupported by

evidence, and simply unbelievable as found by the Arbitrator.

The factual findings of the Arbitrator prove that Cedilla's U[M claim was not fairly
debatable. By reason of contract and resjudicata, these factual findings are binding on Farmers
in Cedillo's bad faith case and should not be an issue.

did

court err in

findings

court

ignored

of

's

faith expert, Mr. Buddy Paul.
Opinion testimony from experts in the insurance industry regarding the fairly debatable
issue and an insurer's conduct being an extreme deviation from industry standard practices is
routinely offered to establish claims of breach of contract, bad faith, and support claims of
purntive damages.

Just as in the district court, Farmers failed in their Respondent's Brief to

contest or rebut Mr. Paul's opinions or his testimony.
incorporated Mr. Paul's

Cedillo expressly referenced and

opinion and deposition testimony in her opening brief. For the

Court's ready reference, Mr. Paul's expert opinions and relevant deposition testimony arc
attached to this brief as Appendix A.
Idaho Code §41-1329 addresses the standards of the insurance industry and may be
considered by the jury (and should have been considered by the district court) in its deliberations
to determine whether Cedilla's claim was fairly debatable or not,

there was an

extreme deviation from industry standards which warrant punitive damages.

Weinstein v.

Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299, 233 P.3d 1221, 1235 (20 I 0).
Paul is an attorney with over forty (40) years of experience in the field of insurance.
He has intimate knowledge of insurance claims handling and adjustment. Mr. Paul's opinions
are qualified by decades of specialized experience, knowledge and skill and arc based upon his
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ma
ustmcnt of
that Farmers acted in

a

faith.

The district court found fault with Mr. Paul's acknowledgment that some aspects of
Cedilla's claim were fairly debatable. But, as this Court will find, Mr. Paul's expert report and
his deposition testimony create more than a genuine issue of material fact concerning the
debatable issue.
Mr. Paul's opm10ns and testimony were offered to assist the district court in
understanding the industry standard of care and customary practices to which Farmers should be
held in connection with Ccdillo's claim.

Mr. Paul's Expert Report cites numerous actions of

Farmers' failure to fairly and timely adjust and pay Cedillo the amount justly due her.

Such

actions are cited in Cedilla's Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion.for Leave to Amend

Complaint and to Add Claim for Punitive Damages and Negligent Adjustment of UIM Claim
which is found in the

at 00182-001100.

These actions include the following:
l.

Farmers' overall conduct in dealing with Cedillo's claim constitutes an
extreme departure from norms in the insurance industry in Idaho;

2.

Farmers' overall conduct could not be characterized as reasonable;

3.

J\t every tum, Farmers repeatedly challenged everything Cedillo did,

everything the arbitrator did, everything the District Court did, and
apparently everything the Idaho Supreme
did;

17

was

6.

7.

Farmers deviated substantially from industry norms
failing to gather
sufficient informalion to fairiy evaluate Cediilo's iost income

8.

Farmers failed to use the medical authorizations executed by Cedillo to
obtain her medical records;

9.

Farmers failed to seek objective medical opinions;

10.

Farrr:ers purposely ignored the medical opinions of Ccdillo's three treating
physicians;

11.

It is clear that Farmers had no interest in being fair to Cedillo;

12.

There is also evidence that Farmers' behavior was the result of malice and
constituted outrageous conduct;

13.

Farmers' files include evidence that its conduct was self-serving and
malicious;

14.

Farmers, instead of asking for objective medical opm1ons, hired
Wilson, a well-known insurance defense doctor, to rebut conclusions of
Cedillo's treating doctors;

15.

Farmers' conduct was an extreme example of putting its own interests
ahead of its policy holder (Cedillo);

16.

Farmers repeatedly delayed payment of amounts fairly owing to Cedillo
due to lack of investigation and outright intransigence as opposed to
honest mistake;

17.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, Farmers overwhelmingly
showed an intent to deny as opposed to an evenhanded evaluation of
Cedillo's claim.

18.

Farmers' conduct demonstrates outrageous and malicious behavior.

19.

Farmers' conduct

Practice
manner:

18

(6):

Not attempting in good
to effectuate prompt, fair, and
equitable settlements of claims
which liability has
become reasonably dear;

Section (7):

Compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover
amounts due under an insurance policy by offering
substantially less than the amounts ultimately recovered in
actions brought against the insureds.

In summary, Mr. Paul's testimony est2blishes Farmers' duties to Cedillo and that
Farmers' failure to comply with its duties was a breach of contract as well as a violation of
industry standards. Farmers' duties include the following:
a.

Duty to Reasonably Investigate

Mr. Paul testified that Farmers had the obligation to timely and properly investigate
Cedillo's claim and, based upon his experience, Farmers failed entirely to timely or properly
investigate Cedillo's claim according to industry standards. For example, it is not disputed that
Farmers, with no investigation, simply closed its file.

Mr. Paul's testimony is that Farmers'

investigation conduct is not consistent with its obligation to reasonably investigate Cedillo's
claim, was a breach of the UIM contract of insurance and is evidence of bad faith.

Mr. Paul provides testimony regarding Farmers' obligation to reasonably settic claims for
which liability is reasonably clear and Farmers' failure to do so.

For example, as cited in

Cedillo's opening brict: days after receiving Cedillo's proof of loss Farmers' adjuster (Ramsey)
inquired of Farmers' attorney (Thomson)

llo's proof of loss complied with Idaho

9

to
m district court

m

this

Farmers'

was contrary to industry

standards, was a breach of the UIM contract of insurance and is evidence of bad
c.

Duty to Timely and Reasonably Assist Cedillo in Establishing Her Claim.

Mr. Paul provides expert testimony regarding Farmers' duty to timely and reasonably
Cedillo in establishing her claim.

Farmers completely failed to assist Cedillo in any

way and intentionally and deliberately searched for ways to defeat Cedillo's claim and that based
upon his experience Farmers' conduct was well outside the standard for the industry, was in
breach of the UIM contract of insurance and is evidence of bad faith.
The record discloses that Mr. Paul's opinions were not contested by Farmers. The issue
of fairly debatable was obviously considered by Mr. Paul in reaching his conclusions. As he
found Farmers' conduct to be taken in bad faith and to justify an award of punitive damages it
can only be concluded that Cedilla's UIM claim was not fairly debatable.

Cedillo's expert opinion

testimony

to amend to allow a

claim for punitive damages meets the requirements of Idaho Code §6-1604(1).
When considering Cedilla's motion to amend her complaint, the question before the
district court was whether there was a "reasonable likelihood" that Cedillo would be able to
"prove, by clear and convincing evidence, oppressive, fraudulent, malicious, or outrageous
conduct." Idaho Code §6-1604 (l), (2).

to even
its

to Cedillo

only opposition offered by

Ccdillo's entitlement to present a

punitive damage claim to the jury was the two

affidavit of Mr. Anderson, a Boise

attorney. R. pp. 2234-2236. Mr. Anderson's affidavit fails to include any factual basis for his
conclusion that Cedillo is not entitled to present her punitive damage claim to the jury.
Mr. Paul's Expert Opinion and deposition testimony concerning Cedillo's punitive
damage claim more than satisfies the quantum of evidence required by [daho Code §6-1604.
Cedillo requests that this Court reverse the district court's denial of her motion to amend and find
that Cedillo may amend her complaint and present her punitive damage claim to the jury.

Discovery issues before

Court.

Pursuant to Cedillo's Motion for in Camera Review (Rc__QQ,_000395-000469), Farmers
lodged documents for the district court's in camera review to determine if the documents or
redacted portions of the documents are protected from disclosure by

this action.

Those same documents have been lodged with this Court.
The district court's Memorandum Decision and Order Granting in Part Plaintiff's

Renewed kfotion to Compel (LJ. 00490-00507) is a very thorough analysis of the legal issues
applicable to this discovery dispute. It was and is Cedillo's contention that due to the nature of a
bad faith claim" ... all analysis and communications are fair game for discovery." R.p. 000495.
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in two unpublished

the

_,____

to

stated in the Stewart Title case CILJ212.,__Q_Q0222-000235),

-~~---

is no Idaho

Court decision addressing the issue faced by Cedell," and as the court noted it was, "essentially
guessing what the Idaho Supreme Court would do under such circumstances. K,__Q._ 000230 and

The district court, having analyzed the documents claimed as privileged then carefully
listed the documents which were not privileged (R.

QQ._

000501 and 000503), the documents

which contained both disclosable and protected information ( ~ . 00050 l-000502)
privileged documents (R.__pp,_ 000502 and 000504).
Cedillo, in her Renewed Motion to Compel (R.J2. 000020 to R.J2. 000310), urged the
district court to find, that under the facts of this case, Farmers had waived any objections it may
have had to Cedillo's discovery.

ruling upon Cedillo's motion, the district court stated,

"absent instruction from the Idaho Supreme Court that late objections are waived, the Court does
not accept that the fdaho discovery rules mandate late objections be waived." R._JL-9Q_9392_.
As detailed in Appellant's Brief at pp.8-13, and in Mr. Paul's expert report, Farmers has
been less than cooperative in the discovery process. Mr. Paul, who has been involved on both
sides of well over l 00 cases with bad faith allegations has " ... never seen a carrier be less
forthcoming or cooperative in producing its basic claims file." (L12.,__00168l.

numerous
to

dates

It is Cedillo's

reserves were set

unique facts of

has waived any

claim.

case, this

should find

alternative, it is Cedillo's contention

this Court will adopt the Cedell reasomng and order Farmers to produce all documents
concerning Cedillo's U[M claim and
Cedillo requests that this

faith claim.
review the sealed documents which have been lodged

with the Court and order disclosure of those documents (1) which are related to Cedillo's UIM
claim and

bad faith claim; and

which arc related to Farmers' investigation and evaluation

Cedillo's claim.

HI.
CONCLUSION
The record proves that
Cedillo's UIM claim.

made an inadequate, careless, if not shiftless investigation
record proves that Farmers never was in a position to exercise fair,

sound, or good judgment in evaluating Cedillo's UIM claim. The record conclusively proven
arbitration, establishes that Farmers deliberately and intentionally failed to conduct any fair
investigation of Cedillo's claim and that it actively sought out information and witnesses to
defeat Cedillo's claim. The record proves Farmers' deliberate, lengthy, and extreme efforts to
delay, deny,

defend against Cedillo's U

claim which was not fairiy debatable.

s
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is also set out

All of my opinions are based upon my training and years of experience as
well as the materials [ reviewed. In my opinion, Farmers' overall conduct
dealing with Ms. Cedillo's claim constituted an extreme departure from norms in
the insurance industry as conducted in Idaho, and for that matter, throughout the
Northwest. Taken as a whole, Farmers unreasonably and intentionally delayed
payment to Ms. Cedillo of portions of her claim. While some individual acts were
based on fairly debatable issues, others were not, and the totality of Farmers'
conduct could not be characterized as reasonable.
[ use the term "Golden Rule" to refer to an insurance company's obligation
to treat its policyholder fairly. As described in abundant case law, a carrier can
never put its own financial interest ahead of the legitimate interest of its insured.
Yet in this case, at every turn, Farmers repeatedly challenged everything Ms.
Cedillo did, everything her counsel did, everything the arbitrator did, everything
the district court did, and apparently everything the Supreme Court did. No entity
can be wrong that often if fairly looking out for the interests of the insured. No
carrier should be satisfied with a case still active today when the accident
occurred 2008.
Farmers' investigation was slow and sloppy by any measure of industry
standards. I will give some examples. Farmers' file and actions claim that it did
not know whether Mr. Steele had paid any of Ms. Cedillo's medical bills until his
testimony in the arbitration. This was objective information very easy to obtain.
Farmers could have and should have obtained this information much earlier. rt
was not a valid excuse for delay in evaluation.
The arbitrator has already ruled that Farmers had enough information to
evaluate this claim when it received the Proof of Loss on July 28, 2009. Farmers
didn't and doesn't like this ruling, and so has consistently fought it in every
October 18, 20 I well over four years
nab le forum-and lost every
$1
was
an

were notations
forum tcr1aea
juries and to
preexisting arguments.
I was asked to review
discovery objections and have seen the
courts' rulings on discovery. I have been involved on both sides of well over l 00
cases with allegations of bad faith, and have never seen a carrier be less
forthcoming or cooperative in producing its basic claims file. Taken together with
asking for reconsideration and appeal at every turn, it is clear Farmers had no
interest in being fair to its own insured.
The evaluation appearing on page 613 is typical of the way Farmers failed
to adequately investigate and evaluate the file. How could Farmers believe Ms.
Cedillo had absolutely zero lost income? Income tax returns arc an important
element of evaluating lost income, but not the only or best tool. Farmers deviated
substantially from industry norms in failing to gather sufficient information to
fairly evaluate lost income.

[ have already indicated that Farmers' overall behavior in nitpicking every
ruling and in fighting discovery was an extreme deviation from industry
standards. There is also evidence that Farmers' behavior was the result of malice
and constituted outrageous conduct. After all was said and done, the arbitrator had
ruled and Farmers was finally going to pay, it insisted on putting Blue Cross on
the check. This, in my opinion, was unconscionable. While putting potential lien
holders on SETTLEMENT checks is sometimes appropriate, that is not the case
where there has been an award by a tribunal. The Farmers' file makes note that
this was-an old case; some charges may have been compromised or even written
off. By putting Blue Cross on the payment check, it would force Ms. Cedillo to go
to Blue Cross and potentially wake up sleeping dogs. The carrier does have a right
to be free of liens, but the way to do so would be to make the check payable to
Mr. Steele's trust account and insist that liens be satisfied prior to disbursement.
This would have protected both Farmers and Cedillo. Instead, Farmers agam
chose to put its own interest ahead of its insured.
malicious
sent a

ll

opm1onasking that
. Amazing a
like this got
true objectives.

It is my opm10n that the totality of Farmers' conduct was an extreme
of the carrier consistently putting its own interest ahead of the interest of
its policyholder. Farmers repeatedly delayed payment of amounts fairly owing
due to lack of investigation and outright intransigence, as opposed to honest
mistake. While some specific decisions could be characterized as fairly debatable,
others were not, and the totality of the circumstances overwhelmingly showed an
intent to deny as opposed to an evenhanded evaluation of the issues. Putting Blue
Cross on the check went even further, in my opinion showing outrageous and
malicious behavior. In my opinion, the conduct of Farmers violated the following
provisions of Idaho Code: IC 41-1329(3), (4), (6) and (7).

Respectfully Submitted,
Irving "Buddy" Paul

Code §41

sections 3,

6, and 7 provide the following:
reasonable standards for the
ansmg

Section (3):

Failing to adopt and
prompt investigation
policies;

Section (4 ):

Refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable
investigation based upon all available information;

Section (6):

Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and
equitable settlements of claims in which liability has
become reasonably clear;

Section (7):

Compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover
amounts due under an insurance policy by offering
amounts ultimately recovered in
substantially less than
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as

l.
2.
3.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
I 0.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
Page

to
income, should
as regards any other possible damage
or loss that
can think of?
Well, yeah. I mean, just going back to
that same template, are you taking any mcdications,arc you missing work, arc there things that you used
to do that you can't do, all of those types of
questions that a competent adjuster would
automatically inquire of at the beginning of the
claim and continuing through it.
Q.
your opinion, is it bad faith if they
don't ask those questions?
A. Absolutely.
Q. And why is it bad faith?
A Because the statute in Idaho says that in
I'm paraphrasing, it's phrased in terms of can't
deny a claim, but you have to do an investigation:
based upon all the information available.
And that's in the statute. And if a
carrier is choosing to ignore some of the
information, it's not in compliance with
statute, all the information available.

lines 14-22

Q. Okay.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
23.
24.
25.

I think [ remember from
the arbitrator's decision that something to the
effect that the company was in a position as of the
date of the filing of the proof of loss to evaluate
all of Ms. Cedilla's claims. [s that right?
A. That's my understanding of what the
arbitrator said we are bound by.
Q. Okay. Do you agree with that?
A. r haven't tried to- I'm forced to agree
with it because it's already been determined. I.
don't think it's my position to second guess a
court, second guess an arbitrator

8

')

.)

.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
l 0.
11
12.
13.
14.
15.
l 6.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

I am on
And I got that because you told me
or four times. Despite the fact that you arc
quote, "bound by it," unquote, do you have an
as to whether or not the company was a
position to evaluate all of Ms. Cedillo's claims as
of the date of the filing of the proof of loss?
A. My own opinion is they were on notice to
where they either could evaluate or could continue
to investigate in order to fully evaluate. l think
there were things that happened after the day of
that proof of loss that Farmers should have
continued to follow and investigate.
They could not possibly have known things
that hadn't happened yet, but they could know that
those things were in the future. For example,
medical records that say she's needing surgery, even
with big words should know even before the surgery
took place.
Q. So [assume-well, you tell me whether
I'm assuming correctly or not. I assume that you
wouldn't say that Farmers was guilty of bad faith by

Page 46, lines 1-25
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
1
15.
16.

continuing to investigate as you have explained?
A. Had they continued to investigate as I've,explained, [ would have been much happier with their.
performance. I still think it suffered from some
problems, but I think they did a very poor job of
investigating.
Q. But would you agree that they weren't
guilty of bad faith because they didn't pay the
entirety of
Cedillo's claim within a reasonable
time after she filed a proof of loss?
A. Well, r can't agree with that.
Q. You think they were in bad faith for not
paying that?
r think they were in bad faith at the
a number of reasons, including
period of time

V

more. They should
continued to investigate more. They should
have made additional payment more promptly. [
never say the
can know in advance the exact
Page
l.

amount

Page 49, lines 19-25
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Q. Andfromthepointofviewofyour
evaluation of Farmers' performance in this case, is
it appropriate for them to go to arbitration or to
court?
A. It was appropriate to arbitrate certain
issues, many fewer than they chose to arbitrate.
They should have paid much more money much sooner

Page 50, lines l-3
1.
2.
3.

based upon their investigation and arbitrated
general damages. I don't know that there's much
else to arbitrate other than general.

Page 50, lines 24-25

25.

A. If it is sufficient to support their
contentions and if their contentions are based upon

Page 51, lines 1-25
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

a full and fair investigation as opposed to writing
a letter to a doctor saying we arc looking for a
doctor to refute what a treating doctor said.
So, you know, if you do it fully, fairly
and completely, you are going to - in many cases
there can be a dispute over what is and isn't
preexisting.
a. And is that dispute part of what we the
l
debatable?

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
Page

You are not saying
1t 1s
inappropriate or bad faith across
insurance company to
or to court?
No. There are many times that's
necessary.
Q. Okay. And can [ go - can [ say it is
not, in your opinion, bad faith across the board for
an insurance company to take a dispute to

lines l
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

arbitration or to court?
A. No. That's why we have courts and
arbitration is to solve legitimate disputes.
Q. Okay, So in the context of our discussion
here, what is fairly debatable and what isn't?
A. General damages arc fairly debatable,
which was the - I go back to what the arbitrator
found as the arbitrator reviewed. The arbitrator
found that the evidence did not support Farmers'
position on what's standard. It wasn't there.
I also point out that Farmers was.
continuing to say it was zero lost income even when;
their own expert was saying there was at least lost
income for the surgery.
[ don't think that- it's possible that
that was partially debatable, but certainly not
debatable the way it was handled and presented, and
more should have been paid.
Q. The lost income claim was partially
debatable?
A. Could have been. I don't know enough to
say that. I know that the arbitrator has said the
position of Farmers was simply not supported by the'
evidence. Why didn't Farmers' own investigation
reach that same conclusion?

3.

5.
6.

7.
8.
9.
10.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

zero
Okay.
So you have to quantify
say
fairly debatable.
Q. Okay.
A. I thought you said maybe partially.
Q. I follow what you are saying.
your
example, if the carrier said 112 and the arbitrator
said 150, is that bad faith that they didn't pay 150
to begin with?
A. It depends on where the 112 came from.
it came from a fair, objective investigation, it's
not bad faith. If it came from
out and ·
looking for argument to support a minimal bad faith
excuse me, a minimal lost income, yes.
The carrier's argument has to be based· on·
fair, impartial, objective investigation. It can't
go out and try to hire people to lower the damages.
If it does, it's bad faith. If the __
arguments are based on a fair, open inquiry
supported by the evidence, that's okay.

Page 55, lines 3-25

I.
2.
3.
4.
5.

7.
8
9.

I 0.
l !.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

phrasing that you are comfortable with. You used
the word "malice."
What is the evidence -what is - first
of all, what was their- what was their malicious ,
conduct, let's start with that, what was their malicious conduct?
A. As I read the file as a whole, it seems to me that Farmers went out of
its way to throw
numerous roadblocks into Ms. Cedillo's path. [t
refused to accept that it was wrong and did
everything it could to avoid paying a fair amount
fix her claim.
ft began as early as the agent warning:
Farmers, Farmers' agent, hey, let's look really
closely at this claim. r find that really bad
behavior, and it seems to typify what happened from
then on.
we can talk
other
fie

lines I
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
I 0.
1! .
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

you said,
carrier.
A. Yeah, I'll give you some good examples.
Q. All right. .
A. That's only one, we started with one.
Number two, the letter that Mr. Thomson wrote, or
letters, asking for a doctor who will opine against
the policyholder.
Q. Is that what his letters said?
A. It said I'm looking for someone to refute
Dr. whatever's opinion that the shoulder was
related.
Q. Okay.
I have never seen a letter that going
that far looking for a favorable opinion as opposed
to looking for an honest, objective opinion.
Q. Okay.
A. That is very, very,
bad
Q. Okay.
A. I think that putting Farmers - excuse me,:·
Farmers putting Blue Cross on one of the payment
checks without ever talking to Mr. Steele and
figuring is that the appropriate way to protect ·
Farmers' subrogation lien interest was malicious and
went beyond the bounds of normal conduct
Q. Why was it malicious?

Page 57, lines 1-25
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

A. Because all it wanted to do was protect
itself from the subrogation without any evaluation
of what it would do to Ms. Cedillo's position.
They should have said, okay, we need to
protect ourselves. r have no problem with that.
Call Mr. Steele and say how do you want to do it, do
you want us to put Blue Cross on the check or do you
want us to
to your trust

9.
10.

a

IS

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

satisfying liens and paying liens,
Farmers docs
Cedillo a position
it was
losing all of its bargaining position as far as
satisfying liens, and there were many other routes
that
could have protected itself without a
negative impact on the policyholder. :
Q. Okay. I think that Farmers asking hiring a lawyer and asking is this letter an
adequate proof of loss at the beginning was at least
bizarre, but in the context of what's happening,
looks to be pretty malicious.
Why even worry about attorneys fees when

Page 58, lines 1-25
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
l 0.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

they first get a claim? They should be worrying
about evaluating and paying the claim. And instead,
it looks like they arc setting the thing up for
litigation from the very beginning and wondering if
this is going to cost us, Farmers, in attorneys fees;
l can't understand why they were doing
that if it wasn't part of this, well, we want to
really tough this one out.
Q. Okay. And just so ['ve got the right
thing written down here, it was asking the lawyer at
the·outset if the proof of loss was A. Adequate.
Q. Sufficient, okay.
A. Under the attorney fee statute.
Q. All right. Okay.
A. objecting to Mr. Steele acting as attorney
after allowing him to participate in the
arbitration. The Supreme Court ruled that they
didn't care whether there was a waiver or not if the
representation was appropriate.
I'm more interested in the waiver issue
because that shows they are trying to trap him.
They are saying, okay, we have had years of
arbitration but now we don't think we should pay
because you were representing her even though we

X

61,

1.
2.
""\

5.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
l 0.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Yeah. What l tried to do so
, l think,
1s
out five that to me are evidence of
mancwus oenav10r.
Q. Okay.
A. I have not thought of any other that I
think of evidence of intent as much as evidence of
how that intent was carried out.
The ongoing appeals, motions for
reconsideration, even losing 7-0 in the Supreme
Court, which takes a mighty lapse in judgment to get '
there, to me,
whole course of appeal,
reconsideration, on and on, while not necessarily
malicious, was certainly outrageous and extreme,.
The closing the file while there was a
pending reserve to me is pretty bizarre. It's, to
me, is evidence that there is something about this
file that something was driving this file other
than an effort to fairly adjust it.,
Was that malice, incompetence, [ don't ·
know, but it struck me as a real extreme deviation
from normal practice to close a file while there was
pending -while there was reserves on it.
t•

•
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1
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Q. Now, as a lawyer, I'm intrigued with
conclusion that appealing a case to the Supreme
Court is extreme behavior.
A. Not in and of itself: but when coupled
with evidence of malice and coupled with evidence of
the way this case has strung out, strung out, strung
out, and strung out with - r think it was extreme.
Did it go as far as Rule 11? r don't
know, but this was the most protracted UlM case ['vc
ever seen, and there was indications of bad motive.
And it's really pretty hard to say on
an insurance case, I mean, that says a lot about the
inadequacies in the argument made, but, yeah, that[
the whole
was extreme and
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Q. And that's part of your analysis here is
that- that the fact that the Supreme Court ruled
unanimously is part of your criticism of the
this case was handied?
A small part, a small part, 'but you have
the arbitrator ruling that there's no evidence to
support this, the arbitrator ruling that certain of
the positions raised by Farmers was pure
speculation.
You have Farmers' evaluation of lost
income inconsistent with their own effort- excuse
me, their own expert. You have a lot of things that
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are part and parcel of this just on, on, on, on, on
And if it were a split decision, I would
be much more convinced that the objective was
completely open-ended, but here I see so many
indications that Farmers just wants to settle all
the time, like as far as trying to disqualify the
attorney. Look at that, I mean, there's a lot of
evidence of malice.
And what did that result in? [t resulted
in an extremely long, slow process. You go back to
the definition, is there unreasonable delay. I
think this met unreasonable delay.
Q. The whole thing?
A. The whole thing from beginning to end;
yeah.
Q. So, you know, as I hear you explain your
position by referencing the arbitrator's decision,
if you lose, you are guilty of bad behavior?
A. Absolutely not. If you lose and you lose
and you lose and you lose and you lose and you lose
and you still are fighting, that is evidence of had
behavior.
Q. How many times do you have to lose before
it becomes bad behavior?
Well, if
was open,
to
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I can't opine
was
malicious or not·
was pretty intransigent and .
hard-nosed about this.
[ don't know where that came from, and it
seems that Farmers disregarded many suggestions that
would have ameliorated the situation.
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Q. Such as?
A. Such as he said that this was a they
took a proof ofloss so why the hell did they
conti::me to litigate that all the way to the Supreme
Court. If they had just listened to him in the
first place, we would have been done a year or two
ago.
Q. What do you mean they continued to
litigate the proof of loss all the way to the
Supreme Court?
A. The issue, one of the issues in the ~
Supreme Court was the prejudgment interest, which
goes back to whether that was proof of loss ..
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A. The main misdemeanor is an ongoing failureto gather information and fully evaluate the case in
a timely manner.
There - I think it's very, very unusual.
and inconsistent with industry standards to have
basically the same evaluation in the file month
after month, well after Ms. Cedilla's second
surgery, and then all of a sudden spring from, I
can't remember, was it 8,000 at that time or 7,000,
I can't remember the number, but all of a sudden it
bumps up to $155,000 evaluation. The reserve goes
up and the check is written.
I don't have any problem with issuing that
check for 155. I have a big problem with why that
wasn't done one or more payments well before
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It's a legitimate question, but it could
have been answered time and time again much, much
eariier than that. Find out. You can't say, oh, we
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just found out and somehow that excuses our slow
behavior.
I'm critical of what looks like getting
fi 11e medical authorizations, I might be wrong, it's ·
really hard when you are reviewing the file and you
see 12 copies of the same thing, but it looked like.
they again and again and again asked for medical
authorizations.
It seemed like they may have needed
whatever it was for the hospital, the hospital
wanted something on their own form, but it seemed
like there were just many, many.
Q. Numerous medical releases?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. So we are going to go back to
number one in a minute, but number one was the
ongoing failure to investigate in a timely manner,
number two was getting numerous medical releases.
Continue with the list of misdemeanors.
A. I thought I already had a third one.
Q. Well, maybe the lost income?
A. Lost incomer have as one.
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or I want to say it was later on, but issuing the,check with the letter saying we have the right to
collect this back.
They needed a way to protect themselves in
the event they won. They needed a way to protect.
themselves if they won, but this was a pretty heavyhanded.
Again, if they just call
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now.
right. Going back to further
investigate a couple of those. With regard to the
losi income, what in your opinion did Farmers faii
to do with regard to lost income that puts this
the misdemeanor category?
A. They failed to overlook the repeated indications from the treating doctor that the
surgeries were related, that her injury was related.
They put undue emphasis on her income tax
returns saying that she made more the year of the
0
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accident than the year before and then totally
discounted the fact that it crashed the next year
and, oh, that was just due to the economy. They
didn't· they were looking for ways to fight the
claim rather than evaluate the claim.
And then again their own witness at the
time of the arbitration said that she would have
lost income at least for the times of the surgeries,
but they didn't even quantify that.
Well, they should have quantified it and
paid it. Again, all they were trying to do was
fight their own policyholder. They didn't try to
figure out what is a fair amount, they just wanted,·
to zero it.
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I would like for you to identify for me the
occasions - the occasions when Farmers delayed
payment such that in your mind it was evidence of
misconduct..
A. I think the original amount of payment was
$25,000, was way low, and I'll call that a delay
because eventually after the arbitration more was
paid. I think the 155 was slow, late, and still ,
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we are going to seek reimbursement; so there .
was no ability to use that money.
check
have been written, but the money wasn't really
transferred and so
was delay and up to the
Supreme Court on that..
So those are specific examples of delays,
and the exact amount, at least the first exact
amount paid, [ think the 155 was pretty low as well,
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Q. Let's take the appeal in this case. Was
that clearly something they should not have done?
A.
my opinion, it clearly should not have
been done given everything that came before. If
this was two years earlier, if there hadn't been two
motions for reconsideration, if the district court
hadn't ruled against you, there are situations where
a case should go to the Supreme Court, but not on
this prolonged history.

